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In the course of preparing the Cooley lectures for the Univer-
sity of Michigan I had occasion to read your exchange with Dick
Posner which clustered around the Cornell-Chicago conference of
this April and May' and which, I take it, will be the basis of both
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University; Arthur Goodhart Professor in Legal
Science, University of Cambridge (1980-81).
1. The papers from this conference are published in a symposium entitled
Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
189 (1980). I was originally scheduled to attend the conference which was organized
by Mario J. Rizzo. Unfortunately a series of unexpected events made it impossible
for me to be there. I received the conference papers from the editors of the Hofstra
Law Review and read them at the end of the summer of 1979 while I was working
on the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, which I delivered at the University of Michigan
Law School in October 1979, under the title: Nonsense on Stilts? The New Law and
Economics Twenty Years Later. This paper was not written to be more than a letter
to Professors Dworkin and Posner (who received a copy) commenting on their inter-
esting exchange. As is my habit, the Cooley Lecures were delivered from notes, and
I am now in the course of writing them up. They include, among other things, a
fuller statement of my views on the subjects touched on, rather casually, in this let-
ter. It did not seem to me inappropriate, nevertheless, to let the editors of the
Hofstra Law Review publish this letter as a "Comment," especially since they
hoped, correctly as it turned out, that publication would stimulate some more excel-
lent thoughts from Professor Dworkin.
A footnote is not the place to answer Professor Dworkin fully, but a few com-
ments can be usefully made. It seems to me that the differences between him and
me are largely verbal, which is not to say unimportant. It is true that I speak of
trade-offs between wealth and its distribution, but I try not to speak of trading off
equality (largely because it means too many different things). And, even when I
speak of wealth and its distribution, I as often use "recipe" language (see, e.g.,
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your and his contributions to the Hofstra Law Review symposium.
Despite the perhaps unnecessarily provocative language in your
first article, 2 language which I fear will lead some to misunderstand
the piece to mean that efficiency in the production of wealth is ir-
relevant to a "just" society, I found myself substantially in agree-
ment with it. If I may oversimplify your fuller and more complex
discussion, it seems to me that you make two points that are hard
to challenge. (Indeed, I think I may have made them myself from
time to time, 3 though certainly not as systematically.):
(1) That without starting points-whether termed rights, enti-
"blend" and "ingredients" at p. 558 infra, and "mix" at p. 559 infra) as what
Dworkin assumes to be "compromise" language (like "trade-offs"). In fact, the whole
tone of my letter is to ask that we concentrate on what blend of wealth, its distri-
bution, and "other justice" notions leads to what can go by the name of justice.
Dworkin asks, instead, what blend or recipe leads to "deep equality." Dworkin, Why
Efficiency? 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 568-70 (1980). He is entitled to use that phrase, of
course. But while I have no great confidence in the term "justice," I must say that I
find the term "deep equality" somewhat misleading and even loaded. In my view of
justice, what can be called "deep equality," is close enough to permit its use without
stretching language. (I certainly have never suggested that I was a teleological utili-
tarian, see, e.g., id. at 572.) But other views of justice--other blends-do exist,
and to assert that the goal of the blend of wealth and its distribution is deep equality
psychologically stacks the deck against some of these. (Psychologically, not logically,
since Dworkin does not define deep equality and so one could introduce what to
some would seem like mighty inegalitarian notions into the term, though perhaps
only at some cost to the ordinary meaning of words.) In the end, however, what one
calls the "value term" may be less important than the functional issues, reached at
the end of both my letter and Dworkin's paper, on when specific institutions like
courts are likely to be good in defining or achieving the blend and when, instead,
they are not.
Two other notes: Dworkin is precisely correct in his discussion on p. 568-69 of
the type of regret one feels at an inability to make a Pareto improvement on a fair
distribution and the type of regret-sacrifice that one does not feel. He is equally cor-
rect in his statement on pp. 582-83 that the Pareto criterion can only be treated
as an all-or-nothing criterion and that any move that involves a deviation from the re-
sult ordained by what he calls the "fanatical" Pareto criterion requires justification in
some non-Paretian moral theory. Since I have been saying this, and its close cousin
(that "what is, is Pareto optimal-unless what is can be unanimously changed," and
then, of course, it will be) for some time, see, e.g., G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 83-87 (1978); Calabresi, On the General State of Law and Econom-
ics Research Today and its Current Problems and Prospects, in LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS 9, 11-12 (G. Skogh ed. 1978); cf. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.
L. & ECON. 141 (1979) (advocating a similar position), I was particularly pleased to
find Dworkin making so elegant and rigorous (more than I could) a statement of the
point.
2. Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. LEcAL STUD. 191 (1980).
3. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, & P. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 32-34; Calabresi, su-
pra note 1, at 12-15; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
[Vol. 8: 553
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tlements, bodily security, or what have you-it is hard to give any
meaning to the term "an increase in wealth." 4 What is viewed as
wealth, at the very least, must depend on the desires of individu-
als. Since these desires in turn depend on the characteristics of in-
dividuals, one must, at a minimum, justify in terms other than
wealth maximization why a person "owns," rather than just pos-
sesses, the characteristics that give rise to his or her desires. In a
way, this is merely a more general way of stating that my superior
intelligence, my ability to hit a baseball as well as Rod Carew, or
my possession of two good kidneys will affect my wants differently
depending upon whether kidneys, intelligence, or batting skill be-
long to society, to those who wish or need to use them, or to me.
To put it still another way, each individual's desires are de-
pendent on, indeed are a function of, his or her initial "wealth."
Since wealth necessarily, in this sense, includes whether one starts
off advantaged or disadvantaged by having a specific characteristic
(like brains, kidneys, or batting skill) in that society, it is hard to
know what to make of a statement that maximizing wealth is a good
thing, unless one has accepted something, other than wealth maxi-
mization, as a ground for initial starting points.
One can get a starting point, of course, if one takes existing
starting points to be "inevitable." But this is simply contrary to
fact. Possession of a characteristic may be inevitable, but owner-
ship is not. And possession without ownership can put one at a dis-
tinct disadvantage. That is, it can alter completely the starting
point; viz., the plight of the beautiful slave and of the slave who is
strong enough to do horrible, killing work. One can also get a
starting point if one is willing to accept historical starting points as
"just," or if one is willing to make some fairly strong assumptions
(which I am inclined to believe most of us do) about "similarity
among individuals regardless of characteristics" in their desire for
"happiness" or "utility." 5 But this merely emphasizes that simple
"desire for wealth" is not a meaningful starting point, because
while one may be able to give meaning to a desire for happiness,
say, apart from other characteristics, one cannot give meaning to
"wealth" and hence to a desire for wealth in such an abstract state.
4. The term is Posner's. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
5. Tony Kronman is currently arguing, persuasively, that an analogous as-
sumption is implicit in Rawls. Kronman, Talent Pooling, NOMOS (forthcoming). See
generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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(2) That even with a starting point it is hard to see how an in-
crease in wealth constitutes an improvement in a society unless it
furthers some other goal, like utility or equality. Even an efficiency
move that makes some A wealthier without making any B poorer
-an extraordinary situation-is not a move toward a better society
unless one is prepared to make the frequently plausible, but not
necessary, assumption that the change also made that A happier
and did not make any B less happy, or that A is made happier and
that any B made less happy by A's greater wealth deserves to be
less happy because envy is "bad." In either event, the efficiency
move is, as you say, 6 merely instrumental and needs to be attached
to some account of what it is instrumental toward before it can be
evaluated. The same is true, a fortiori, in the ordinary situation in
which A's greater wealth makes some B poorer.
It seems to me that at the end of your and Dick's polemic he
does not really disagree with this last point; rather he does not find
it necessary to specify the complex mixture of desirable goals (util-
ity is too simple for him) which he claims wealth maximization
serves better than any other testable instrument. Not being a phi-
losopher, I would not myself require a precise complex of goals to
be spelled out. I am even skeptical of such an exercise in an open
society.7 Posner's concept of wealth maximization would be enough
for me if I thought it were, in practice, a better instrument than
any other available one for furthering a plausible, if not completely
coherent, complex of goals that were apparently adhered to by
most people in a society, even if with no great consistency. Were
that the case, the furthering of wealth maximization simpliciter
might indeed be a worthwhile aim of some institutions (even
judges, perhaps) in that society.
The trouble is that wealth maximization, apart from its distri-
bution, does not seem to me (and I would warrant to most) to fur-
ther even that muddle of aims which I, more tolerantly than you,
would accept. It only necessarily serves "utility" on the most pe-
culiar, not to say absurd, assumption about the relationship be-
tween wealth and utility, namely, that $1 is as likely to be worth as
much to the rich person as to the poor person. One can be quite
an agnostic about interpersonal comparisons and still say that that
particular assumption is a lousier one than most. It clearly does not
serve equality. It might, ironically, serve a bastardized maximin,
6. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 195.
7. See generally G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITr, supra note 1.
[Vol. 8:553
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but only under a series of uncertain empirical assumptions, per-
haps more commonly made in the nineteenth century than today,
about the trickling down of wealth. (I say bastardized, because the
poor who would benefit, even under these assumptions, would
usually be the next generation of poor. Thus, the beneficiaries are
those who would benefit in the future from economic growth and
not the currently least advantaged.) In any case, one would be
hard put to explain why even this would not occur sooner if one
self-consciously traded off some wealth maximization for some
speedier redistribution, assuming a trade-off were needed.
I do not doubt that there exists an unspecified complex of
goals-that can be spoken of in justice-value terms-that are better
served by wealth maximization, without redistribution, than by
other "measurable" instruments. I also do not doubt that Dick
Posner, in a not totally systematic way (of which as I said I do not
disapprove), "holds" these goals. I only suggest that in holding to
these, he is in a very small minority. And, I would suspect that
most people would say, and indeed do say, "Your goals, Richard,
are fine for you, but without a lot more in the way of equality
(pass, for now, of what) they are totally unacceptable to me."
All this leads to the part of your polemic with Dick that I find
less successful. And that, as you might have suspected, is Part IV,
where you speak of me and of the more "modest" efficiency-as-
value theorists.8 My argument with you here is less with your anal-
ysis than with its applicability to me. I do not, and never have,
held that one can trade off efficiency and justice. I will admit that I
am clearer on this point in some of my writings than in others. But
even The Costs of Accidents,9 which is the one to which you ad-
vert' 0 and which is perhaps the least clear, should be clear
enough. I do say of any system of accident law that it has two prin-
cipal goals. "First, it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce
the costs of accidents."" I do not find any passage in which I say
that "these goals may sometimes conflict so that a 'political' choice
is needed about which goal should be pursued.' 12 What I do say is
quite different:
Though I list justice or fairness as a goal, it will soon be appar-
ent that . . . I do not treat it as a goal of the same type as cost
8. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 201-05.
9. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
10. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 201.
11. G. CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 24.
12. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 201 (footnote omitted).
1980)
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reduction but as a veto or constraint on what can be done to
achieve cost reduction. Viewed this way fairness becomes a final
test which any system of accident law must pass.13
I then criticize "claims . . that justice is in some sense a goal con-
current with accident cost reduction" on the ground that "[tihey
seem to suggest that a 'rather unjust' system may be worthwhile
because it diminishes accident costs effectively," and conclude that
"justice is a totally different order of goal from accident cost
reduction. Indeed . ..it is not a goal but rather a constraint that
can impose a veto.'14 None of this supports trade-offs, I think.
Justice language is different from efficiency and, I think,
wealth distributional language. As a result it only confuses things to
talk about trading justice for efficiency. This is consistent with the
assertion that both wealth-efficiency and its distribution are, in
your terms, at least ingredients of justice. They certainly are in
utilitarian theories. It may even be that, in some theories, equality
of distribution of wealth is, in your terms, a "component of
value."'15 I do not think it is in utilitarian theories, and I wonder
whether there is value in a society in which all equally starve to
death. But that is neither here nor there.
What is more to the point is that "modest" theorists, like my-
self, do contend that it is possible to speak of trade-offs between
efficiency-wealth maximization and wealth distribution. Indeed, we
would say that it is nearly impossible not to do so and still make
some sense out of what goes on in just about every society one can
look at. In your "last" reply to Posner you do the same when you
say, "The question is not whether redistribution inhibits efficiency
or whether a great decline in efficiency hurts the poor. It is
whether justice is better served by some redistribution at the cost
of some efficiency.' 16 I would go further and say that an appropri-
ate blend of efficiency and distribution is highly instrumental to-
ward, and closely correlated with, achieving what many would
view as a just society.
Some would go further (and on some utilitarian assumptions it
is easy to see how) and say that the appropriate blend is the just
13. G. CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 24 n.1.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 195.
16. R. Dworkin, Unpublished Comments at 14 (1979) (commenting on Posner,
The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243
(1980)) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
[Vol. 8:553
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society, or would be if it could be defined and achieved. I have
been more reluctant than many to go that far. I have always be-
lieved that efficiency and distributional language does not translate
directly into justice language; that there are components of the just
society that could only be encompassed in the terms efficiency and
distribution if these terms were given a meaning far different from
their ordinary ones. Hence the discussion of "Other Justice" in The
Costs of Accidents 17-which has been misinterpreted by some to
imply that I believe that "justice" is a value separate from effi-
ciency and distribution and to be traded off against them. "Other
Justice," as I have made clear in later writings, was meant to sug-
gest that an appropriate mixture of wealth-efficiency and its distri-
bution does not guarantee a just society.18 To put it another way,
equating an appropriate efficiency-distribution mix with justice re-
quires assumptions that are neither intuitively obvious nor so
widely accepted as to permit me to say, "Solve the problem of that
mix and you have justice."
Whether one wants to call these constraints (within which effi-
ciency and distribution must work if they are to be instrumental to-
ward justice), "rights" or, as I did, "veto points," is not terribly in-
teresting. More interesting would be the question of what one
ought to do if, in fact, an agreed upon efficiency-distribution mix
ran into one of these veto points. Ought one to assume that such
rights are definable with sufficient precision and absoluteness that
either (a) an error has been made in the efficiency-distribution mix
or assumptions, or (b) in the particular case at hand the instrument
fails to further the goal?' 9 Or may one, instead, use the clash to
question whether what one thought was a right is, in fact, a right?
Mistakes are made by all, and what may seem to be rights may just
be perpetuations of historical injustices. If one believes the "instru-
ment" generally leads very near the "good," one is more apt to
take this last position and use the clash to force a reexamination
not only of the efficiency-distribution assumptions, but also of the
asserted veto.
Where does all this leave law and economics? Not in bad
shape, I think. Clearly, the relationship between the instruments
(efficiency, distribution) and the goal (justice) needs to be studied.
17. G. CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 24-26.
18. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1102-05.
19. A utilitarian might say, "That mix which in other cases furthers utility does
not do so here."
1980)
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Intuitively most people would, I would guess, think the fit reason-
ably close. Sufficiently so, in fact, to assign to some institutions the
task of furthering a given mixture in a given context. Enough also
to justify criticizing institutions or laws when they blatantly fail in
furthering either of the instruments, or what plausibly seems an
appropriate mixture of the two.
But why not say, instead, that all should study the "goal" di-
rectly? That assumes that all should be philosophers, and, more
important, that the best way to get to a point is always to focus di-
rectly on it, rather than on some road signs that point toward it.
This is an assumption that is, I think, patently false. If, moreover, it
be the case that some institutions are pretty good at finding road
signs while others are better at defining the end point and sug-
gesting when the road signs are apt to head away rather than to-
wards the goal, it would be silly to ask both sets of institutions to
be concerned either with the end point or with the road signs.
I believe that law-and-economics is concerned with the road
signs. I also believe that this is both an intellectually worthy and
difficult task. It is especially difficult because finding road signs
that are not too misleading to be worth spending time on (like
"wealth maximization" simpliciter) requires the lawyer-economist
to make assumptions about distribution.2 0
Such assumptions about distribution have not been made and
studied in any systematic fashion by economists in the past. Philos-
ophers, like Jules Coleman, are trying to make a start at examining
economics from this point of view.21 And certainly the kind of work
Sen is doing22 and the kind of work Little did23 (which characteris-
tically Sen is among the few wise enough to appreciate) suggests
that a great deal can be done. I would also not shrug off old Abba
Lerner-after all, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, the
guess that any member of a species of animal is more like other
members of that species24 than different from them is not a silly
guess.
20. Assumptions which I would argue, but cannot do here, are no more precari-
ous than those which traditionally have been made by economists in talking about
efficiency.
21. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of
the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980).
22. See, e.g., Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA
53 (1977); Sen, The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Survey, 17 J.
EcoN. LImERnAruE 1 (1979); Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHILOSOPHY
463 (1979).
23. I. M. D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1957).
24. See, e.g., A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 23-40 (1944).
[VIol. 8:553
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But once again that is all beside the point, which in the end is
simply: if lawyer-economists do not make the mistake of claiming
too much for what they are doing, and if they are willing to work
at defining and analyzing pretty good instruments leading toward
the just society, philosophers ought not be troubled. Indeed, they
might even find it profitable to reexamine critically their conclu-
sions as to particular rights and particular manifestations of justice
when the lawyer-economists' instruments seem to conflict with,
rather than further, the results which the philosophers' particular
conception of justice would seem to call for. Conversely, the
lawyer-economist should be highly skeptical of the empirical as-
sumptions on which he or she has based his or her analysis when
such a conflict exists. This factual failure is as likely to be the
source of the conflict, as is the more obvious possibility: namely
that the best instruments or ingredients are not the "goal" or even
components of the "goal" and so may at times mislead.
I have not, and this may seem odd to you, said anything in
this letter about the role of courts in all this. That is too large a
topic, and is in any case separate from the topics treated above. I
know you believe that courts are eminently suited to further the
"'goal" directly and are not suited to define and work out the "in-
struments." Dick Posner, conversely, thinks courts good only at
furthering what, for him, is at least a crucial instrument-wealth
maximization. (I assume that by now you have disabused him of
the notion that it is the "goal.") He also thinks we can show empir-
ically that they have been doing just that.
I find it hard to explain judicial behavior in America simply in
terms of wealth maximization. But I find it equally hard to explain
it only in terms of ultimates or principles. In other words, my
guess would be that courts do decide policies as well as principles,
and perhaps more often the first than the second. The policies are
based, and again I am guessing, on that mixture of efficiency and
distribution that in the particular context is thought by the court to
be instrumental toward justice and, in particular, does not violate
any fairly precisely defined rights or veto points.
Whether that is an appropriate task for that institution is an-
other matter and one that I wish to pass for now. My only thought
on that at this point is that such a discussion works better in con-
text than in the abstract. I find it difficult, in other words, to con-
sider that issue apart from the capabilities of other institutions. For
that reason, discussions of the role of courts that do not distinguish
England from America (let alone both of these countries from Italy
1980]
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and France) seem to me prima facie suspect. One can say: "If they
are assigned task X (policies, for example) because they are the
most suited to that task in that society, they are no longer courts."
But that, I think, would just trivialize a very important issue in the
allocation of functions in a society.
Enough, enough. As you can see, your excellent paper set me
off on many a tangent, and for that as well as for your acute analy-
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